As an agent points out in United States v. Graziano, 07-cr-508 (JFB), 2008 WL 789886 (E.D.N.Y. March 20, 2008), computers can be repositories of one’s most private, even subconscious, thoughts.  Asked why he examined Internet history files when searching a defendant’s computer for gambling records, he explained they “help[ ] to give you what the user was thinking about . . . at this particular time.”  As a result, the agent uncovered and tagged an AOL search entitled “Arson RICO laws,” ostensibly for use in the gambling investigation, because RICO is “a federal statute that is used to prosecute illegal gambling offenses.”  In the end, however, it became key evidence in a parallel investigation that led to an indictment charging the defendant with arson of a competitor’s business.

The Computer Search

The defendant moved to suppress the search of the AOL search records as beyond the scope of the search warrant, which authorized a search for gambling records.  In denying the motion, the district judge reached two notable conclusions:

(a)     Overbreadth

First, the Court rejected the defendant’s challenge that the search warrant was overbroad because it failed to include a “search protocol,” delineating the particular computer files to be searched and the search terms that could be utilized.  Noting that “courts are ill-suited to micromanage in advance how the computer will be searched,” the court emphasized, however, that in seeking the warrant, “law enforcement must establish the basis for searching the computer and particularize the evidence being sought during such search.”

But computers can contain warehouse loads of documents, including the equivalent of boxes of photographs, personal e-mails and Internet search histories.  It is hard to see how any of this information could yield the specific documents sought in this search warrant: “records of bets, accounts and transactions, including betting slips, made in the course of illegal bookmaking activity.”  Thus, where is the prejudice from precluding law enforcement in advance from searching those files (and denying the agents an opportunity to turn the computer search into a general fishing expedition)? 
 
(b)        Reasonableness

The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the manner of the search here was unreasonable, because the search involved a cursory review of every file, including Internet search files, and was not confined solely to obvious gambling files and documents.  Citing Supreme Court precedent that a brief review of apparently innocuous documents is permissible in searches for papers, the district court held that “it was entirely reasonable for the [forensic examiner] to engage in a cursory review of files and documents, by opening them, to determine whether they contained evidence of illegal gambling that was within the scope of the warrant.”

The court found that the bookmarking of the “arson RICO laws” search, once it had been uncovered, was reasonable given the agent’s credible testimony that he saved the evidence because gambling is prosecuted under the federal RICO statute (though, perhaps more plausibly, the evidence comes under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement).

The more critical issue is whether it was reasonable for the agent to search records containing Internet search histories at all (such files are listed with the designation “htm” or “html,” and are thus readily identifiable to the examiner in advance as Internet search history files).  The district court credited the agent’s “reasonable belief that evidence related to an illegal gambling operation might be contained in AOL search records.”  That may be true (searches for sports scores, etc.), but, as noted above, the search warrant here did not authorize a search for all documents related to an illegal gambling operation.  Rather, it specified particular gambling-related records that may be searched for and seized, documents that would not be contained in files with Internet search histories. 

The court does not address how Internet search records could reasonably be related to or produce the specific gambling records at issue.  (The case also does not address another interesting issue – raised by Judge Weinstein in United States v. Polizzi, 2008 WL 1886006 (E.D.N.Y. April 1, 2008) – that is, whether the searched files could have been independently obtained from AOL itself, as some courts have held that an Internet user can have no expectation of privacy in their Internet search histories).

Defendant’s Offer to Take a Polygraph

In the same decision, the court ruled on an issue of first impression in the Second Circuit - whether the defendant’s offer during an interview with the prosecutor to take a polygraph should be admitted at trial as consciousness of innocence.  Granting the government’s motion in limine to preclude the evidence, the found the offer had no probative value because it was not made in the context of an agreement that the results of the polygraph, whatever they were, would be admissible.  “Given the lack of adverse consequences from such an offer, there is no way to distinguish between the offer being made by an innocent defendant and the offer being made by a guilty defendant for purely strategic reasons.”

Advising Jury of Potential Penalties

Finally, in an interesting counterpoint to Judge Weinstein’s decision in Polizzi, the court ruled that the defendant could not cross-examine the cooperating witnesses as to the mandatory minimum sentences they had faced prior to their plea agreements, because “such reference would advise the jury as to the punishment the defendant is facing.”

There is a curious irony to Judge Weinstein's decision in United States v. Polizzi, 06 CR 22 (JBW), 2008 WL 1886006 (E.D.N.Y. April 1, 2008).  Although for many it is a quintessential example of liberal judicial activism, the decision is rooted squarely in conservatives' favorite theory, originalism, i.e. interpreting the constitution minus over two hundred years of history.  And, incidentally, it is hardly a philosophy that Judge Weinstein has been known to embrace.

Of course, the bigger irony in the decision is that we must reach back in history to more barbaric times to find compassionate practices that mitigate the barbarism of today's mandatory minimum sentences.  Holding, contrary to decades of precedent, that he had erred in failing to advise a jury of certain mandatory minimum sentences applicable in a child pornography possession case, Judge Weinstein points out that a jury in 1791 would most certainly have known the consequences of their decision (such jury, it should be noted, made up of white, male property owners), and would thus have been empowered to show mercy by manipulating its verdict.  Polizzi puts pay to the idea that any judicial philosophy is less malleable than another or more likely to restrain judicial law-making. 

Facts
 
At the heart of this decision is the tragic story of Peter Polizzi, an Italian immigrant who on the surface had achieved the American dream – successful businessman, father of five, self-taught guitarist.  Psychologically scarred, however, by childhood sexual abuse, he secretly repaired to a double-locked room above his garage over a five-year period, where he viewed and downloaded images of child pornography.   There was no evidence that he had ever forwarded the images to another, or engaged in any improper conduct with a child. 

A subscriber to a website targeted in an FBI investigation, Polizzi was arrested and prosecuted for possession and receipt of child pornography.  At trial, jury rejected his insanity defense and found him guilty on all counts.  He faced a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years on the receiving counts. 

When informed after their verdict of the mandatory minimum sentence, three jurors indicated that they would have voted not guilty by reason of insanity had they known of the applicable mandatory minimum, and two other jurors indicated that they believed Polizzi should be treated not incarcerated. 

Failure to Advise Jury of Mandatory Minimums

Building on these jurors’ amended thoughts, Judge Weinstein crafts a compelling opinion that the defendant had a right to have his jury informed in advance of the mandatory sentence riding on their decision.  Reviewing legal and historical scholarship regarding criminal practices in the Thirteen Colonies, the court concludes that trial juries during that period would not only have known of the harsh sentences to be imposed on a finding of guilt, but also "would have been expected to deliver a verdict of not guilty or of guilty of a lesser crime had it believed the punishment excessive for the crime actually charged and proved."

Why should such practices apply today?  “With the advent of mandatory minimum sentences . . . federal juries today again face-albeit often unknowingly –‘either-or’ choices similar to those facing the British and colonial juries of 1791 [i.e. death/transportation/whipping or conviction of a lesser crime]. To fully exercise their historical function, juries today must understand the two eithers; they cannot rely on the court to mitigate because it is bound by the statutory minimum term of imprisonment.”  If juries are not just fact-finders, if they are truly the bulwark that curbs judicial, executive and legislative power - "the conscience of the community and guardian against government oppression ... [and] a 'safety valve' for exceptional cases" - then, Judge Weinstein reasons, juries must be entrusted with complete information regarding the consequences of their actions, including information about their power to dispense mercy through nullification.

Putting aside concerns that hearkening back to the days of the Eighteenth Century would not always be a giant step forward, or that knowledge of mandatory minimums may harden rather than melt jurors' hearts, the Polizzi holding is a persuasive and creative approach to mitigating the severity of mandatory minimum sentences. 

Few expect this decision to survive Second Circuit scrutiny. But Judge Weinstein has his eye on higher courts - the court of public opinion for one, and, of course, the Supreme Court, which given its current ideological make-up, may be more than a little receptive to his call for a return to 1791 and a limited reintroduction of the jury’s power to nullify.   The Supremes may also revisit the issue addressed at the beginning of the Polizzi decision: that the statute at issue is void for vagueness and overbreadth, because it has the potential to criminalize innocent behavior. 

Lack of Scienter

In a nutshell, the Polizzi court finds the statute problematic because it penalizes “knowing” possession and receipt of child pornography, but does not require on its face that the individual "intend" to possess such material. While equating knowledge with criminal intent may work with traditional crimes like possession of stolen goods or drugs, the court points out, this construct fails to account for the myriad ways in which one can inadvertently receive and possess materials via the Internet - "where email may be automatically received, files can instantaneously download themselves, web pages shown for only a fraction of a second are automatically stored, and knowledge can first be acquired after the fact of receipt.”  As one FBI agent put it, the court quotes, "[o]ne click, you're guilty."  In fact, the court claims (perhaps a bit hysterically), that one of its interns refused to conduct certain Internet research on the case for fear of committing a crime. 

It is this significant potential for the statute to penalize accidental and benign conduct that renders it void for vagueness and overbreadth - problems, the court concludes, that cannot be rescued by the stingy safe harbor provision in the statute, or suspect judicial efforts to imply an intent element.  Constrained by precedent to reject the challenge, Judge Weinstein clearly believes this is an area ripe for revisitation by the appellate courts.

Other Challenges

The Polizzi opinion also addresses a number of interesting challenges that, for one reason or another, were inappropriate in this particular case or are foreclosed by current precedent.  They may however prove more fruitful under a different set of facts or in the future as society's perception of these issues evolve:

• Eighth Amendment: Five years for "psychologically stunted man who . . . suffered vicious sexual abuse as a child" and who needs "treatment not a destructive long prison sentence," is undoubtedly cruel, the court concludes, but unfortunately, is not unusual, where "cruelty in punishment is adopted by Congress as policy."  Moreover, although some may find the punishment in Polizzi's case to be "shockingly disparate" - particularly in light of the passive nature of his crime, his psychological disabilities, his low risk of recidivism, and the public "scourging" or registration as a sex offender that awaits him after prison - it is not unconstitutionally "grossly disproportionate" to the crime committed under applicable case-law.  In this context, the court does an interesting analysis of the median sentences meted out by states for similar conduct (producing some very useful material for those seeking to challenge draconian sentencing guideline ranges in child pornography case), and also importantly queries the tendency to lump all sex offenders together when addressing their future dangerousness.  Such conclusions "fail to take into account differences between pederasts and voyeurs."

• Irrationality: Similarly, the five-year mandatory minimum for receipt of child pornography, while a severe penalty for Polizzi's crime, is not irrational, as that term is defined, despite the fact that the possession count does not carry any mandatory minimum.  Congress is not held to "a precise calculus of harm and risk."  Importantly, in this section, the court notes that the evidence regarding whether child pornography actually encourages viewers to commit physical sexual offenses (often presented as a given) is in fact inconclusive.

• Multiplicity:  Conflation of possession and receipt raises a problem of multiplicity (indictment improperly charges a single offense multiple times in separate counts, when only one crime has been committed).  The court did not need to address this issue since it was setting aside the verdict on the receiving counts. 

• Rule of Lenity: This doctrine of statutory construction requires a court to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a defendant.  Unfortunately, the mandatory minimum Polizzi was subject to is totally unambiguous, and does not (but surely should) "contain an implicit reasonableness limitation." 

• First Amendment: The court notes the tension created between First Amendment rights (such as the right to view adult pornography in privacy) and the expansive regulatory and enforcement efforts to curb exploitation of children, and cites several decisions that have struck down child pornography legislation as unconstitutionally overbroad.  One of these decisions, however, was recently overruled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Williams, 2008 WL 2078503 (May 19, 2008) ("pandering" provision of PROTECT Act neither overbroad nor vague).

• Fourth Amendment: The court highlights the tension between legal constructs of what is a "reasonable" expectation of privacy in the online context, and the actual expectations of online users.  In particular, he questions the validity of denying Fourth Amendment protections to non-substantive communications (such as email subject headings and Internet search queries) when the line between content and non-content may be impossible to draw, and thus lead to unduly invasive searches by law enforcement.

• Separation of Powers: The court notes the concern that statutory mandatory minimums have shifted too much power from the judiciary to the executive, but concludes that "on the basis of current precedent," applying the functional approach of analyzing statutes under the separation of powers doctrine, the mandatory minimum prescribed for receipt of child pornography passes muster.  The kicker here is "current precedent," which the court obviously believes needs revisiting. 

This huge decision (not just literally in length, but also in heart and compassion) is a must-read for anyone defending someone charged with possession of child pornography. 

As Judge Sack notes in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Elfgeeh, 06-744, 2008 WL 383046 (2d Cir. February 14, 2008), charting a course between protecting a defendant's Due Process rights and the public's right to learn about a trial through uninhibited press coverage is a difficult challenge.  Hence a series of procedures, established in the Second Circuit decision of United States v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1977), to deal with prejudicial trial publicity:  first ascertain whether the publicity contains potentially prejudicial material and whether the jurors might have been exposed to it; second, if the answer to that question is yes, do an initial inquiry of the jury to determine if any of its members have been exposed to it; and third, examine individual jurors exposed to the publicity, outside the presence of the others, to determine the extent of the exposure and effect on the juror's attitude to the trial. 

In Elfgeeh, the defendants, an uncle and nephew, were charged with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business that was used largely by members of Brooklyn's Yemeni-American community to transfer money abroad.  While the government harbored concerns that the business had been used to funnel money to support terrorist activity, no such charge was included in the indictment, and the court made clear that the government and its witnesses could not allude to terrorism throughout the trial.  The issue was, nonetheless, the elephant in the room at the trial, which commenced (how inappropriately) on September 12, 2004.  Moreover, days later, all the major New York tabloids carried stories on the trial, strongly suggesting a link between this trial and other terrorism prosecutions, and questioning the district court's ruling that the issue of terrorism be avoided.

On the day the articles appeared, the prosecutor brought the issue of the press reports to the attention of the judge, asking the court to admonish the jury to avoid press accounts of the trial, which the court duly did. Counsel for Aref Elfgeeh (the nephew) asked that the jury be polled as to whether any had read the particular articles discussing the trial.  Counsel for Abad Elfgeeh (the uncle, who, incidentally, had connections to an individual connected to Al Qaeda), however, indicated a preference for not polling the jury.  The court stood by the decision to issue merely a general admonishment.

The majority held that the court's decision not to follow the Lord procedures was not an abuse of discretion, finding that it was hardly clear that the jurors had seen the offending articles, and, in any event, it was within the district court's discretion to side with Abad, whose attorney had stated a preference against polling.  The court also, in a troubling statement, found that where the standard admonishment not to read or watch anything about the trial is given, "we may presume in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the jurors have followed the court's instructions and have rendered their verdict solely on the basis of the evidence at trial."

In a compelling dissent, Judge Sack rejects the idea that a general admonishment was sufficient when the negative publicity was widespread, quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”).  He points out that the idea the jurors in a high profile trial may not have read articles in the three major New York tabloids as they commuted into court is preposterous.  Moreover, he took issue with the Court's conclusion that here, "in a situation where there was an extraordinary danger of actual prejudice," Abad's preference for not polling should be privileged over Aref's request for polling.
 
At the heart of the dissent is a legitimate concern that an innocent man may have been convicted.  As Judge Sack states:

This is not purely a theoretical matter. I fear that there is a substantial danger that Aref, at best a third-string player in the scheme for which he was indicted, was convicted because he was a member of the Yemeni community, and the jury suspected that the prosecution was, at bottom, about terrorism and Al Qaeda, supported by publicity to that effect. I do not see how, with respect to Aref, the error can be said to be harmless.

This decision joins another recent decision from the Second Circuit, discussed here, that shows a disturbing disregard for Due Process issues relating to Muslim-Americans.  Once again, I ask the question, who will reign in hysterical responses to terrorism other than independent federal judges, tenured for life?

The image of a juror laughingly shouting "guilty, guilty, guilty" to another juror prior to the commencement of deliberations is certainly an unseemly one, likely to lead to an inquiry by the court and possibly even the dismissal of one or both of the jurors.  But not, an EDNY court ruled in United States v. Sabhnani, 2008 WL 150216 (E.D.N.Y. January 14, 2008), when the evidence of the event is presented after the verdict has been announced. 

Following the defendants' convictions in a much publicized case (previously discussed in this blog here and here), the defense moved for a new trial and a hearing to investigate alleged prejudicial juror misconduct, based on information from a press photographer that he had observed two jurors in a parking lot several weeks prior to the verdict "speaking and laughing and heard one of those jurors shout 'guilty' two or three times."  This was premature deliberation, the defense argued, violating the defendants' right to a fair trial.  In addition, the defense requested that the jurors be ordered to testify at a hearing.  This request, the defense argued, did not violate Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) - which precludes jurors from testifying as to any matter purely internal to the jurors' deliberations - because the alleged misconduct occurred prior to the deliberations.

Here, the defense faced two hurdles in persuading the judge to put the jury's process under a microscope - the fact that a verdict had already been rendered and there is a strong tradition favoring the finality of verdicts, and the fact that the alleged misconduct involved intra-jury communications, which pose "a less serious threat to a defendant's right to an impartial trial than extra-jury influences."  In the end, the court denied the motion, concluding that "[o]ne juror's potentially out-of-context, single word comment, does not demonstrate that the jurors prematurely deliberated, but more importantly, it does not demonstrate that the juror would be unreceptive to opposing arguments or that any juror failed to participate in deliberations in good faith." 

Interestingly, the court also found that Rule 606(b) would preclude the jurors'  testimony at a hearing on the matter. Although that rule expressly applies to deliberations, and at issue here were pre-deliberations statements, the court found, citing a 6th Circuit case, that this alleged misconduct constituted "a potential influence on the jury" and "Rule 606(b) prohibits post-verdict interrogation of jurors as to internal influences."